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TS #141718-B
IAC-D-116/2
24 February 1958
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

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Proposal re

Consideration

of Estimates of Soviet Military Capabilities Related to

Defense of North America

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The attached draft reply to the letter (IAC-D-116,

14 February 1958) which was discussed at the IAC meeting on 20 February

is forwarded for review by the IAC members. Concurrences or any

comments regarding the contents of the letter should be given to the

IAC Secretariat (Code 143, extension 3402) prior to noon Wednesday,

26 February, since we propose to pass this reply shortly 25X1C

thereafter, for transmittal

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Secretary

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what we knew at that time.

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Thank you for your letter of 14 February transmitting message which I have discussed with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

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With respect to the proposal in first paragraph, of an immediate meeting to seek to reach common conclusions, I doubt that a meeting such as proposed would achieve this. As you know, we have had an extremely full exchange of all relevant information. Our differences are primarily in one field and are based upon the most difficult issues of judgment, particularly concerning the degree to which the advant of long-range missiles will affect the Soviet requirement for long-range bombing strength. On this issue, the position taken by the discussions was wholly consistent with the basic 25X1C US in the recent National Intelligence Estimates from which you will see that we ourselves are not yet of one mind on this subject. Those estimates were the product of an exhaustive consideration terminating in November and December. While they are under continuing

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review we have not recently received hard intelligence to add much to

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I believe, however, that it might be helpful if designated repreexpert on the Soviet Air Force, were to come to sentatives of your 25X1C Washington and brief the IAC members on the view concerning 25X1C estimated present and future Soviet heavy bomber strength and other matters bearing on Soviet long-range aviation, the inc would welcome you . 25X1C Since our estimates on Soviet missile capabilities seem closely in accord, I do not feel that a similar briefing on missiles is so urgent. However, since all thinking on aircraft and missiles is so 25X1C closely related, an insight into judgment on missiles might be a desirable part of the presentation.

With respect to the proposal in second paragraph, the procedure for intelligence support to NORAD is currently under review by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, who of course exercise direct command responsibility in the US with respect to NORAD. Accordingly, I should like to defer a response on this question pending for consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As I have indicated the 25X1C intelligence contribution of NORAD is consistent with the IAC national estimates.

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